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This briefing paper reviews the contemporary issues in UN Peacekeeping and 
international law. As it explains, the key issues and problems currently relate to the use 
of force, international human rights, international criminal law and 
accountability. There is a real need for a greater clarity on these issues, because 
of their significant policy and operational implications. Success in better 
understanding and addressing these issues is central to improving the 
performance of UN Peacekeeping, which has become a crucial international tool 
for enhancing peace and security.   
 
1 Introduction and background 
 
Section 1 of this paper explains the background to the development of UN 
peacekeeping. Section 2 explains some of the key contemporary issues in UN 
peacekeeping and international law. Section 3 discusses current work and 
literature on each of these issues, and Section 4 identifies areas for further 
research and potential improvements in UN Peacekeeping effectiveness, before 
the paper concludes in Section 5.  
 
The immense growth of United Nations (UN) peacekeeping in quantitative, 
qualitative and normative terms is one of the major developments of the post-
Cold War era. Peacekeeping has become a key activity of the UN despite the fact 
that it was not envisaged in the UN Charter. Today the Secretary-General 
currently has command of around 124,000 UN peacekeeping personnel, at a cost 
of over US$7 billion during the last financial year.  
 
Since its inception, the demand for UN peacekeeping has grown dramatically, 
and the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has mandated ever more robust 
and complex tasks for UN peacekeepers. UN Peacekeeping traces its origins to 
the failings in practice of the United Nations’ collective security mechanisms in 
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the aftermath of the Second World War. The UN Charter contained provisions 
that envisioned a UN standing force to enforce and police the peace, but rifts 
between the major powers in the early days of the Cold War ensured this never 
happened. UN Peacekeeping emerged as an alternative to the standing force to 
be used in particular situations. 
 
Traditional UN Peacekeeping operations (UNPKOs) were limited in the scope of 
their operations. What is often seen as the first UN Peacekeeping force, the UN 
Emergency Force I (UNEF I), was deployed to Sinai in Egypt in 1956 as an inter-
positional force and mandated to monitor the ceasefire and ensure the 
withdrawal of forces, with very little authority to intervene.  
 
With the notable exception of the UN operation in the Congo (ONUC) deployed in 
1960, prior to 1990, most UN Peacekeeping missions followed the UNEF I model: 
small observer forces, they were sent in to monitor ceasefires and act as buffers 
between conflicting parties. The number of operations was also relatively small, 
as the main powers in the UN Security Council (UNSC) were able to limit 
peacekeeping missions to ensure they did not significantly impact on their 
sphere of influence. 
 
The political space and developments brought about by the end of the Cold War 
led to significant developments. As post-Cold War conflicts broke out (and peace 
negotiations for some commenced), a proliferation of UNPKOs were authorised 
by the UNSC to undertake varied, but on the whole increasingly robust, tasks in 
countries such as Angola (UNAVEM II), El Salvador (ONUSAL) and Cambodia 
(UNTAC). Although some of these missions followed the traditional model, in 
that they were predominantly observer missions, other operations, such as 
UNTAC were given broad mandates and charged with multidimensional tasks 
ranging from promoting human rights to maintaining law and order.  Most 
recently, the UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) has been 
authorised to use force and even to assist the Congolese army in operations 
against rebel groups. 
 
Whilst the general evolution can be charted of UN Peacekeeping from observer 
missions to robust operations, the development has not been clear cut and 
strategically formulated, and has not been clearly framed by international law. 
Rather, the history of UN Peacekeeping to-date is one of ad-hoc responses, 
driven by the demands of the international political situations and realities, and 
the situations on the ground. Thus, when the USSR and France became uneasy 
about ONUC, they protested and UNPKOs on the whole remained limited in scope 
until the end of the Cold War. At that point, with the balance of power no longer 
an issue, and Western powers in the UNSC under domestic pressure to act in 
response to conflicts and massive human rights violations, UNPKOs were 
mandated increasingly to intervene in different conflict situations around the 
globe.   
 
The history of UN Peacekeeping as one of reactive rather than proactive 
measures, without a strong legal framework to guide it, has brought with it 
significant problems. With more robust and far reaching mandates has come 
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greater engagement with the local populace and recent allegations that 
peacekeepers have committed human rights violations and could be potentially 
complicit in war crimes. This has threatened the credibility and viability of 
operations and underlined the need for an articulated legal framework.  
 
The following section introduces some of the key contemporary issues in 
international law and UN peacekeeping: (a) the international legal framework 
for UN Peacekeeping; (b) the use of force by UNPKOs; (c) International Human 
Rights Law (IHRL) and UN Peacekeeping; (d) International Criminal Law (ICL), 
transitional justice and UN Peacekeeping; (e) Attribution of conduct and 
responsibility; and (f) Accountability and reparations. Section 3 discusses 
current work and literature on each of these issues, and Section 4 identifies areas 
for further research in these areas, before the paper concludes in Section 5.  
 
2 Key issues and problem areas 
 
This section introduces some of the key contemporary issues in international 
law and UN peacekeeping: (a) the international legal framework for UN 
Peacekeeping; (b) the use of force by UNPKOs; (c) International Human Rights 
Law (IHRL) and UN Peacekeeping; (d) International Criminal Law (ICL), 
transitional justice and UN Peacekeeping; (e) attribution of conduct and 
responsibility; and (f) accountability and reparations.  
 
(a) The international legal framework for UN peacekeeping 
 
UN Peacekeeping has had great difficulty in providing adequate guidance for UN 
Peacekeeping. The general legal framework for UN Peacekeeping is unclear, and 
policy developments have very much led the way in providing the framework for 
UN Peacekeeping.  
 
The ‘Guiding Principles’ of UN peacekeeping - consent, impartiality and non-use 
of force except in self-defence (and defence of the mandate) - were developed 
during the UNEF I deployment and expanded upon during the later UNEF II and 
UNFICYP missions in Sinai and Cyprus. The three principles were initially 
intended to guide the deployment and activity of UN inter-positional cease-fire 
monitoring missions in inter-state conflicts. As UN peacekeeping evolved to meet 
the needs of the changing international security environment, and missions were 
often deployed into complex intrastate conflicts, the principles were stretched 
and constantly reinterpreted, to the point that they appeared of questionable 
relevance to some missions, such as MONUC. 
 
Notwithstanding this, each year the UN Special Committee for Peacekeeping 
Operations (C-34) reaffirms the principles in its annual report, and the 
Secretariat publication, ‘UN Peacekeeping Operations, Principles and Guidelines’ 
(the Capstone Doctrine), also includes a reference to the three principles. While 
the principles may provide guidance for ensuring a successful UN peacekeeping 
operation, they do not have any formal legal status, nor have they been explicitly 
adopted by the UNSC.  
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As mentioned, UN Peacekeeping evolved as a practical response to fill the gap 
left by the failure of the UN collective security mechanisms. There is no express 
legal provision for UN Peacekeeping in the Charter, and this may be one of the 
reasons for the lack of an articulated legal framework, although it is now 
generally agreed that UN peacekeeping is authorised as an implied or inherent 
power of the UN. 
 
However, there is a lack of a more detailed understanding of the parameters that 
regulate and limit the actions of UNPKOs. The UN is not a party to treaties in the 
same way that States are, thus making it far harder to determine which 
obligations are binding on the UN. The UN has only a partial legal personality (as 
opposed to States, who have full legal personality), and this makes it difficult to 
determine how the UN is bound by international law.  
 
The lack of clarity is accentuated by the UNSC resolutions that mandate the 
missions. Such UNSC resolutions are subject to highly politicised negotiations 
driven significantly by the five permanent members’ political interests. For 
example, in some cases responding to domestic civil society pressures at home, 
specific interests in relation to allies (e.g. example China and Sudan), whilst the 
main troop-contributing countries (TCCs) and the Non-Aligned Movement on the 
whole remain cautious or opposed to the enhancement of, for example, of human 
rights standards in relation to UNPKOs. 
 
The language in the resolutions themselves is often difficult to discern as a result 
of deliberate political ambiguity. There is also often debate as to which clauses of 
each resolution are operational or legally binding and which are merely 
suggestive, and this leads to uncertainty in implementing the mandate on the 
ground. Commanders on the ground, and even the senior UN decision makers at 
the top, have been left devoid of a clear policy and legal framework within which 
to carry out their UN peacekeeping missions.  
 
(b) Use of Force by UNPKOs 
 
The use of force by UN peacekeeping operations is a difficult and politically 
sensitive issue. The legal position is one issue among a number that makes the 
use of force issue challenging in practice. It is often unclear in what 
circumstances and what level of force peacekeepers may legally use. This lack of 
clarity can have a significant impact on an operation. Any use of force beyond 
self- defence requires a mandate from the Security Council. The Security Council 
resolution mandating an operation will often indicate the purpose of the 
authorisation of the use of force (e.g. the protection of civilians). However, what 
is less clear is the legal right of UN peacekeepers to use force in circumstances in 
which the use of force is not specifically authorised by the Security Council.  
 
Although the UN has the power, under Chapter VII of the Charter, to authorise 
the use of force, it is not always clear in UNSC resolutions mandating UNPKOs 
where force has been authorised.  
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The legal basis for a mission mandate will also have implications for the use of 
force. The absence of a clear indication that a mandate is issued under Chapter 
VII can create uncertainty regarding the extent of the use of force authorised (e.g. 
in self-defence or beyond). The UNSC has often used the phrase ‘all necessary 
means’ to signal the authorisation of the use of force, but this is a broad and 
imprecise formulation. 
 
The use of force by UNPKOs is further clouded by the concept of self-defence. 
The right to use force in self-defence is one of the guiding principles of UN 
Peacekeeping, but its interpretation has evolved over the years from defence of 
UNPKO personnel and property in missions such as in UNEF I, to defence of the 
mandate as was first conceptualised in the UNFICYP and UNEF II operations. 
What amounts to use of force in defence of the mandate can be therefore very 
difficult to implement.  
 
The use of force by missions has come to prominence for example with the 
recent development of the protection of civilians policy by the UN in missions 
such as MONUC, and the involvement of UNPKOs such as MONUC as direct 
parties to the conflict.  The right of UN peacekeepers to use force to protect 
civilians is part of the inherent rights of a UN peacekeeping operation, consistent 
with the purposes and principles of the UN Charter, but this needs to be make 
clearer.  
 
In summary, there are many uncertainties about the legal basis for the use of 
force in UN peacekeeping. These uncertainties have a real and negative impact 
on decision made in UN peacekeeping operations, often with unfortunate 
consequences including the harm of civilians.  
 
(c) UNPKOs and International Human Rights Law 
 
The general problem of applying international law to UNPKOs is particularly 
apparent in the case of International Human Rights Law (IHRL). The UN does not 
have any clear obligations under any human rights treaties and it is not party to 
them,  and it is difficult to understand how customary international law binds the 
UN. 
 
Whilst it is generally accepted in a broad sense that the UN is bound by IHRL,1 
the particular legal basis for the application of IHRL to UNPKOs is still in some 
doubt, as discussed further in the Section 3.2  Although these issues are quite 
technical in nature, they have a real practical bearing on the ground, in terms of 
                                                        
1 See for example the UN’s own recognition of the application of IHRL in a 
general sense in the Capstone Doctrine and the ‘We are United Nations 
Peacekeeping Personnel’ (UN Doc A/61/645, Annex III) prepared by the UN 
Secretariat and given to all individual peacekeepers. 
2 It should be noted that there is no doubt as to the scope and extent of the 
application of IHRL to the UN in situations where the UN is acting as the State 
and is bound by IHRL, as, for example, in the transitional administrations in 
Kosovo (UNMIK) and Timor L’este (UNTAET). 
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understanding what particular obligations the UN is bound by and the 
operational guidance given to UN peacekeepers on the ground. 
 
Furthermore, using terminology borrowed from the main international human 
rights treaties, it is not clear whether UN Peacekeepers must not only respect but 
also “ensure” respect for IHRL by others. This raises questions such as whether 
UN peacekeeping operations have duties in relation to preventing non-State 
actors (e.g. rebel forces), and potentially even State actors (e.g. military), from 
committing human rights violations in the area in which the mission is operating 
and the ability to act. The key issue is the extent to which UN peacekeeping 
missions can be obliged to prevent human rights violations by other actors 
within their field of operation.  
 
The rules of international human rights law may also allow in certain 
circumstances for derogations and limitations of those rights. Derogations are 
permitted only in very specific situations and providing specific formalities are 
complied with (e.g. an announced declaration of a state of emergency by the 
State concerned). Although UNPKOs will frequently be involved in situations that 
may amount to a state of emergency, it is unclear whether any derogation is 
permitted or what mechanism would allow the UN to derogate from its human 
rights responsibilities in this way. 
 
In short, it is very difficult to ascertain the extent and scope of the application of 
IHRL to UNPKOs. This results in a lot of uncertainty at mission level. This has 
become an increasingly important issue as UNPKOs have found themselves 
operating in territories (such as the eastern DRC) where there is a lack of State 
control. In such instances, to what extent should the UN be “ensuring” respect for 
human rights in its areas of operation? There have also been increasing numbers 
of cases involving allegations that UN peacekeepers have committed human 
rights violations. Aside from the accountability issues discussed at 2(f) below, 
clarity is needed as to what obligations the UN has in order to ascertain how it 
may violate those standards, and to help reinforce regulations on UN personnel 
conduct. 
 
If the extent and scope of the application of IHRL to the UN was clarified, there is 
still the issue of resolving what mechanism might be used to put this into 
practice. It can perhaps be useful to consider by analogy the UN Secretary-
General’s promulgation of the “SG’s Bulletin on the Observance by UN forces of 
international humanitarian law”. This Bulletin is a set of internal UN rule which 
set out how UNPKOs are bound by international humanitarian law. However, as 
discussed above, the application of IHRL may be different to each UNPKO if 
basing its obligations on its functions. For example, UNFICYP in Cyprus is 
engaged mainly only in monitoring a ceasefire, with little or no intervention in 
any other capacity, whilst MONUC in DRC has been engaged in combat 
operations. As such, their differing functions, and differing capacities, may entail 
different human rights obligations, and finding a suitable mechanism that is able 
to incorporate this flexibility is a real challenge. 
 
(d) UNPKOs, International Criminal Law and Transitional Justice 
UN Peacekeeping Law Reform Project, University of Essex ©     7 
 
 
As previously discussed, the extent to which the UN is bound by international 
law remains unclear. This results in lack of clarity in a number of different areas, 
including in international criminal law (ICL). In relation to ICL, the problem is 
understanding the obligations that UNPKOs have in relation to international 
courts and tribunals, and in relation to individuals suspected of committing 
international crimes. The role of UNPKO in transitional justice is also unclear, 
and stems from the lack of clarity in relation to IHRL and ICL, as well as the 
failure to incorporate the concept of transitional justice into the UN policy and 
legal frameworks for UN Peacekeeping. 
 
Despite the conclusion of the UN-International Criminal Court (ICC) Relationship 
Agreement (the “Relationship Agreement”), it is unclear what duties the UN has 
towards institutions such as the ICC. The importance of this issue has become 
extremely relevant with the Bosco Ntaganda case in the DRC, where the UN was 
working with this Congolese army commander who was subject to an ICC arrest 
warrant. Actioning any arrest might involve a challenge to the sovereignty of the 
host State, the DRC, if consent was not obtained. This presents a number of 
problems for the UN, particularly as it would seem to be clearly against the 
principles and purposes of the UN Charter which include “promoting and 
encouraging respect for human rights” for the UN to be working with a military 
commander suspected of war crimes.   
 
Clearly the UN itself has become more concerned with these issues. In DRC the 
UN eventually decided to develop a “conditionality” policy to guide MONUC’s  
operations with the Congolese army, whereby MONUC was advised it could not 
support Congolese army units where there was a real risk those army units 
might violate the relevant international law. 
 
How the UN deals with individuals suspected of international crimes is also 
relevant for its role in transitional justice. UNPKOs, by their very nature, often 
operate in transitional contexts, and will have to deal with persons who may 
have been involved in war crimes or crimes against humanity. However, the 
concept of transitional justice is conspicuously absent from UN Peacekeeping’s 
policy and legal framework and is almost never included in any of the operative 
language in UN mandates, despite the promulgation of the Secretary General’s 
Guidance Note on the United Nations approach to Transitional Justice. 
 
The problems in applying IHRL to UNPKOs translates through to issues in the 
UN’s role in transitional justice. For example, it remains unclear what role 
UNPKOs have, or the boundaries they are to respect, in post-conflict 
accountability for serious crimes in States where there are UN missions. The lack 
of clarity in relation to IHRL means that the parameters for UN actions are not 
clear. 
 
(e) Attribution of conduct and responsibility 
 
The issues surrounding legal attribution of conduct need to be dealt with as a 
pre-requisite to the substantive problems relating to potential violations of law 
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such as IHRL or ICL by UNPKOs discussed above. For UNPKOs to be clearer about 
what standards to apply, it needs to be established what activities are attributed 
to the UNPKO under the international law of responsibility of international 
organisations. While a simple enough sounding question, it has lead to problems 
in practice.   
 
The most widely accepted approach, reflected in the International Law 
Commission’s draft Articles on the responsibility of International Organisations, 
is that if the UN exercises “effective control” over the conduct of its 
peacekeepers, it is responsible for their acts. Generally, that means where the 
Secretary-General assumes the command and control of military forces, the UN is 
responsible under international law for the acts of those forces. This general rule 
is supplemented by the assumption that a subject of international law (e.g. the 
UN or a State) is responsible for the actions of its organs (e.g. peackeeepers, 
police) regardless of whether those organs act within their legal powers (e.g. 
torture by the police).    
 
However, the legal practice is not entirely clear on what satisfies the test of 
“effective control”. Practical issues arise in relation to how much control the UN 
has over its forces, with varied mandates and operations with different 
organisational structures. These complications are amplified in situations where, 
for example, the UNSC authorises missions but the UN does not lead or command 
them, as is the case with the ISAF force in Afghanistan, which was originally 
deployed as a multi-lateral force led by the US and the UK and was only 
subsequently authorised by the UNSC.  
 
Further difficulties arise in relation to ascertaining the ‘parallel responsibility’ of 
States for the activities of national military or police contingents part of UN 
peacekeeping operations.  It is possible for responsibility to be attributed both to 
the UN and a contributing State. However as a matter of practice, the conduct of 
UN peacekeeping forces has tended to be attributed to the UN only and UN 
immunities asserted, rather than also attributed to the contributing State of 
contingent members.3 As will be discussed below, this has resulted at times in an 
accountability gap, whereby in effect neither the UN nor the individual State can 
be held legally responsible for UN peacekeepers’ activities. 
 
(f) Accountability and reparations 
 
If the issue of attribution and responsibility is a pre-requisite to understanding 
what legal standards apply to the UN, and when there has been a violation of 
those standards. The issue of accountability and reparations arises at this stage 
as a consequence of finding a violation, for example, of IHRL or ICL. 
 
As touched upon in the previous section, there is an overarching problem in 
terms of holding the UN accountable for violations of international law, even if it 
is possible to identify the applicable legal standards. In some of the recent case-
                                                        
3 See for example Behrami and Behrami v France, Samarati v France, Germany 
and Norway, App Nos 71412/01 & 78166/01 (2 May 2007). 
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law involving the situations in Iraq and Bosnia-Herzegovina, national courts 
have shown a willingness to attribute responsibility to the UN, rather than to 
individual contributing States, but not always in appropriate situations.4 The 
Courts in these cases have stated that they are unable to exercise jurisdiction 
over the UN, and it is for the UNSC to deal with the UN’s responsibility in such 
situations. Clearly, the current lack of an independent forum to deal with 
accusations of UN legal responsibility in these situations is inadequate, for 
example, for acting inconsistently with human rights obligations. 
 
International law has in place a complex and strong regime of immunities for UN 
personnel that also impacts on accountability. The immunities regime makes it 
extremely difficult for local courts in, for example, host states in which there are 
UNPKOs, to hear cases against UN personnel. Although the UN’s immunities are 
essential to the workings of the UN (it would, for example, be very difficult to get 
States to contribute staff to UNPKOs if immunities were not in place, and could 
make it much easier for host states to hamper the work of the UN), the increasing 
numbers of cases where UN personnel have been accused of committing IHRL 
violations have meant that the immunities regime has undermined the UN’s 
international and local credibility and support. Although the Secretary-General 
has, in most cases, the power to waive immunity, this is rarely exercised, in part 
because of the political fallout and legal problems that might ensue from such a 
waiver. 
 
In cases involving allegations against military members of a UNPKO, the 
contributing State has the right (which is not exercised only in exceptional 
circumstances) to repatriate the individual concerned and subject him/her to its 
own disciplinary and/or court procedures. However, although there have been 
cases where this has occurred, such as cases in Canada following allegations 
against Canadian peacekeepers in Somalia.5 While contributing States have a 
legal obligation to carry out national investigations and prosecutions, the lack of 
an international accountability mechanism means such national processes are 
often not fully effective. 
 
The UN has in place a system for UN peacekeeping missions for claims and 
reparations. However, this system is very focused on contractual or similar 
claims, it has very strong conditions and limitations,6 and is not designed to deal 
with the kind of human rights and criminal claims against UNPKOs that are 
becoming more common. 
 
                                                        
4 See, for example, Al Jedda v Secretary of State for Defence [2007] UKHL 58 and 
Mothers of Srebrenica v Netherlands and the United Nations, Appeal Judgment 
(May 30, 2010), Case number: 200.022.151/01, English translation available at: 
http://www.haguejusticeportal.net/Docs/Dutch%20cases/Appeals_Judgment_M
others_Srebrenica_EN.pdf.  
5 R v Brocklebank, Court Martial Appeal Court of Canada, (1996) 134 DLR (4th) 
377. 
6 General Assembly resolution 52/247, “Third-party liability: temporal and 
financial limitations”, (1997). 
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3 Type of evidence and analysis 
 
This section will review and briefly summarise current work on the issues raised 
in section 2 above. 
 
(a) International law and UN Peacekeeping 
 
A significant amount of discussion of international law and UN Peacekeeping 
over the years has been focused on the authority of the UN (in particular, the 
UNSC) to establish UNPKOs, whether by direct reference to specific articles in 
the UN Charter,7 or through its interpretation as an implied or inherent power.8 
This discussion remains largely academic, because it has now been accepted 
including by the International Court of Justice that the UN has authority to 
establish UNPKOs.  
 
Generally speaking, there has been very little recent work on UN Peacekeeping 
legal issues. Most analysis and reform efforts for UN peacekeeping have been 
focussed on policy only and not touched on legal issues. This is evident from a 
brief review of the UN’s Peacekeeping Resource Hub of peacekeeping analysis 
and research9 and relevant international journals.   
 
(b) Use of force by UNPKOs 
 
The issue of to what extent UNPKOs can use force has been debated for a number 
of years. Much of the academic and policy discussion has centred around the 
legal basis for UNPKOs and discussion of UNSC’s use of Chapter VI or VII of the 
UN Charter, the latter clearly allowing the use of force. UNPKOs have at times 
been described as a “Chapter VI and a half” operations, underlining the uncertain 
nature of this area of law.  
 
A lot of discussion has centred on the self-defence exception. Whilst it has clearly 
been accepted that UNPKOs have the right to use force in self-defence, the scope 
of the right is uncertain. The increasing use of force by ONUC in the Congo in the 
1960s prompted the former director of the UN Office of Legal Affairs (OLA) to 
comment that the concept of self-defence had been stretched “to incredulity and 
beyond its usual legal meaning”.10 During the deployments of the UN 
Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) in 1964 and the second UN Emergency 
Force (UNEF II) in 1973 the use of force precept was expanded to encompass the 
non-use of force except in self-defence and in defence of the mandate and this 
                                                        
7 A. Orakhelashvili, ‘The Legal Basis of the United-Nations Peacekeeping 
Operations’, Virginia Journal of International Law, 43 (2003), pp 485-524.  
8 N. White, ‘The UN Charter and Peacekeeping Forces: Constitutional Issues’, 
International Peacekeeping, 3 (1996), pp 43-63. 
9 Available at: 
http://www.peacekeepingbestpractices.unlb.org/PBPS/Pages/Public/Home.asp
x 
10 Quoted in T. Findlay, The use of force in UN peace operations, (SIPRI, 2002), p. 
9. 
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has been endorsed subsequently by the UN General Assembly each year. Whilst 
Romeo Dallaire proposed using the right to self-defence to protect civilians in 
Rwanda in 1994, on the whole the UN has been unwilling to sanction the 
application of the extended concept, and it remains unclear to what extent it can 
be used for such measures.  
 
In recent years the use of force by UNPKOs has become bound up with other 
issues, as is evident from the ‘conditionality’ policy developed by the UN for 
MONUC, which tries to condition MONUC’s collaboration with the Congolese 
army so that MONUC did not find itself complicit in any abuses committed by the 
Congolese army. 
 
(c) IHRL and UNPKOs 
 
There are a number of different theories examining how international human 
rights law (IHRL) applies to the UN. The UN Charter clearly states that one of the 
purposes and principles of the UN is “promoting and encouraging respect for 
human rights and for fundamental freedoms” and it has been argued that this is 
legally binding on the UN.11 Another perspective is that the Universal Declaration 
on Human Rights and the obligations it prescribes define the meaning of “human 
rights” in the Charter.12  
 
It has also been suggested that, the UN, although not party to any human rights 
treaties, should have similar or the same obligations as its constituent members. 
Finally, and perhaps most persuasively, there is agreement in the literature 
reflected in various UN policy documents that the UN is bound by international 
human rights under customary (i.e. general) international law.13 Although 
establishing customary international law in relation to international 
organisations can be difficult, references to human rights in UN documentation 
are too numerous to list. These approaches are usefully summarised by Megret 
and Hoffman14, however, the literature fails to address in any detail how and 
which human rights apply to UNPKOs.  
 
                                                        
11 B. Simma et al., The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary (Oxford 
University Press, 2002), p. 40. 
12 J. Humphrey, ‘The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Its History, Impact 
and Juridical Character,’ in B.G. Ramcharan, Human Rights – Thirty Years after the 
Universal Declaration: Commemorative Volume on the Thirtieth Anniversary of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Kluwer Law International, 1979). 
13 A. Clapham, ‘Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors’ in The Collected 
Courses of the Academy of European Law, XV/1:1, New York, USA: Oxford 
University Press, available at: 
http://iheid.ch/faculty/clapham/NSAlecture/HR%20obligations%20of%20non- 
State%20actors.pdf.   
14 F. Megret and F. Hoffman, ‘UN as a Human Rights Violator-Some Reflections on 
the United Nations Changing Human Rights Responsibilities’, Human Rights 
Quarterly 25 (2003), pp. 314-342. 
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NGOs have also repeatedly called for UN Peacekeepers to respect human rights.15 
The UN itself acknowledges that it is bound by international human rights law in 
a number of its internal documents, including its main peacekeeping policy 
document the Capstone Doctrine, although these acknowledgements are couched 
in very general terms and do not offer much specific guidance.  
 
At the University of Essex, the Peacekeeping Law Reform Project is attempting to 
remedy this defect by examining in detail the applicability of international 
human rights law to UNPKOs in a consultation-based research project. The 
preliminary findings of this project will be available online shortly at 
www.essex.ac.uk/plrp.  
 
(d) International Criminal Law, Transitional Justice and UNPKOs 
 
Until recently, literature and policy on international criminal law (ICL) and 
peacekeeping has focused on the prosecution of individuals who are the parties 
to the conflict.  It has not dealt in much detail with the role UNPKOs have in 
international criminal processes, including relating to International Criminal 
Court, and how UNPKOs should deal with those individuals subject to 
international criminal arrest warrants.16 
 
Although the 2010 Secretary General’s Guidance Note on the United Nations 
Approach to Transitional Justice is helpful in outlining the general principles of 
transitional justice, little has been done in the way of follow up or integrate this 
into the framework for UN Peacekeeping. Transitional justice is mentioned in 
some of the UNSC mandates and resolutions, but hardly ever in the operative 
sections, and it remains conspicuously absent from the UN’s main peacekeeping 
policy documents such as the Capstone Doctrine and the annual UNGA resolution 
on peacekeeping. In the academic literature there is in general a dearth of 
materials on the legal and policy integration of transitional justice in UNPKO 
activities. 
 
Recently, however, the controversy over the issue of the UN’s potential 
complicity in war crimes in DRC, highlighted by its involvement with the ICC 
indictee and Congolese army commander, Bosco Ntaganda, has brought issues of 
international criminal law, transitional justice and UN Peacekeeping to the fore. 
Questions have been asked as to whether the UN should be supporting units led 
by such individuals, and NGOs such as Human Rights Watch have called for 
MONUC to assist in arresting him.17 Similarly, although different in terms of 
politics and law, some of the literature discussing the indictment of Sudanese 
                                                        
15 See, for example, Human Rights Watch, ‘You Will Be Punished: Attacks on 
Civilians in Eastern Congo’ December 13, 2009, available at: 
http://www.hrw.org/node/87151.  
16 See, for example, G-J.A. Knoops, The Prosecution and Defense of Peacekeepers 
under International Criminal Law, (Martinus Nijhoff, 2004). 
17 Human Rights Watch, ‘DR Congo: Arrest Bosco Ntaganda,’ 2 February, 2009, 
available at: http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2009/02/02/dr-congo-arrest-
bosco-ntaganda.  
UN Peacekeeping Law Reform Project, University of Essex ©     13 
 
President Omar Al-Bashir has touched on the possibility of the UNSC authorising 
an international force to arrest him.18 
 
(e) Attribution of conduct and responsibility 
 
Attribution of conduct and responsibility are quite a technical area of law. The 
debate in this area has resided mainly in the academic and judicial arenas, the 
latter comprising the case-law on this issue, discussed at 2(e) above. The 
International Law Commission (ILC) has led the way in trying to codify the 
international law of the responsibility of international organisations, basing its 
draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations (the DARIOs) 
on the subject mainly on the existing Articles on State Responsibility for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts.  
 
The DARIOs are not as widely accepted as the Articles on State Responsibility, 
which are generally considered to reflect customary international law. There are 
difficulties in ascertaining customary international law for international 
organisations, and in coming up with a code that is flexible but cohesive enough 
to cover all international organisations, ranging from institutions as diverse as 
the World Trade Organization to the UN. Indeed, the DARIOs have been criticised 
in some quarters for precisely this reason,19 as well as the lack of practice in 
some areas covered by the draft Articles. It remains to be seen whether the 
DARIOs will be able to achieve the same status as the Articles on State 
Responsibility. 
 
(f) Accountability and reparations 
 
Much of the debate surrounding issues relating to IHRL and ICL and UNPKOs has 
centred on the problem of accountability. A number of human rights NGOs have 
called for UNPKOs to be held accountable for breaches of IHRL and ICL,20 and 
have advocated that troop-contributing states conduct vetting exercises to 
ensure that individuals suspected of committing human rights violations do not 
participate in UNPKOs.21 These issues have also been dealt with in the academic 
literature, which has, for example, documented cases where troop-contributing 
                                                        
18 A. Dworkin & K. Iliopoulos, ‘The ICC, Bashir, and the Immunity of Heads of 
State,’ 19 March, 2009, available at: 
http://www.crimesofwar.org/onnews/news-darfur9.html.  
19 See José E. Alvarez, “International Organizations: Accountability or 
Responsibility?,” Luncheon Address, Canadian Council of International Law, 
Proceedings of the Annual Meeting, 2007 (available at 
http://www.asil.org/aboutasil/documents/CCILspeech061102.pdf). 
20 See, for example, Amnesty International’s long-standing ’15-point programme 
for Implementing Human Rights in International Peace Operations’, available at: 
http://www.genderandpeacekeeping.com/resources/5_Amnesty_International.
pdf.  
21 Amnesty International, ‘Nepal: Bar human rights violators from UN 
peacekeeping missions,’ 18 December, 2009, available at: 
http://www.amnesty.org.au/news/comments/22304/.  
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countries have failed to ensure the proper investigation and trial of their 
personnel.22 
 
There has also been academic discussion of whether the Secretary-General’s 
discretion to waive immunity is unfettered, or if, in certain situations, 
particularly where serious human rights violations are concerned, the Secretary-
General has a duty to waive immunity.23 However, this has to date gained little 
traction in practice, and is indeed unlikely to, given the political context and 
consequences, as troop-contributing countries would react negatively to any 
such finding. 
 
4 Practical implications 
 
This section will examine the practical implications of each of the issues 
discussed above and identify areas where further work and research is needed. 
 
(a) International law and UN Peacekeeping 
 
The lack of a foundational legal framework in UN Peacekeeping underpins many 
of the other issues and problems discussed in this paper. Clearly, it would be 
politically impossible to resolve this by trying to amend the UN Charter, and very 
difficult to get consensus on a complete legal framework for UN Peacekeeping. In 
addition, this may not be the most effective way to better frame UN 
Peacekeeping, in that some of the larger, contextual issues, such as the UN’s 
ability to establish UNPKOs, are already settled including by case law of the 
International Court of Justice. 
 
What is needed, therefore, is more work on some of the specific issues along the 
lines set out below to ensure that UNPKOs have a legal framework to guide their 
actions in the areas most relevant to UN Peacekeeeping today. Such approaches 
will need to incorporate a certain level of flexibility so that UNPKOs are still able 
to respond to evolving demands, but provide a frame of reference that will help 
UN Peacekeeping to become a more coordinated and holistic, and principle-
based and consistent with international law. 
 
(b) Use of force in UNPKOs 
 
While the inherent right of UNPKOs to engage in self-defence has not been in 
question, commanders are often left in doubt as to the extent they can use the 
right of defence of the mandate to, for example, protect civilians from imminent 
harm. The lack of certainty may impact operational effectiveness, and leaves 
members of military and police contingents open to criticism for failing to act or 
                                                        
22 A. Ladley, ‘Peacekeeper Abuse, Immunity and Impunity: The Need for Effective 
Criminal and Civil Accountability on International Peace Operations,’ Politics and 
Ethics Review 1, no. 1 (2005), pp. 81–90. 
23 F. Rawski, ‘To Waive or Not to Waive: Immunity and Accountability in UN 
Peacekeeping Operations,’ Connecticut Journal of International Law, 18 (2002-3), 
pp. 103-132. 
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acting contrary to the legal limitations on the use of force. Further research on 
the legal, policy and operational limits of the right to self-defence, such as that 
being done by the UN Peacekeeping Law Reform Project at the University of 
Essex in the context of a review of the Model Status of Forces Agreement,24 
would assist commanders to understand their rights and obligations in this area. 
 
(c) International Human Rights Law and UNPKOs 
 
Much is needed in the way of analysing the applicability of international human 
rights law to UNPKOs. The plethora of instances in which UN Peacekeepers are 
alleged to have committed human rights violations, from involvement in human 
trafficking to allegations of illegal detention and mistreatment in UNPKOs, makes 
this an urgent imperative. 
 
While some flexibility in the policy framework has been necessary as UN 
Peacekeeping has evolved, the lack of a foundational legal framework has led to 
the policy-based principles of human rights being treated as almost irrelevant in 
some cases. The lack of a legal framework and understanding of how IHRL 
applies to UNPKOs has resulted in ad-hoc approaches which have led to 
violations and inconsistent implementation of IHRL by UNPKOs. An improved 
top down-approach is required, providing guidance and standardisation across 
different missions, to ensure that UNPKOs remain cohesive and coordinated, and 
IHRL violations minimised. This will also help the UN to fulfil one of its guiding 
principles, to encourage and promote human rights and fundamental freedoms. 
A failure to address these issues will only undermine the UN’s credibility. 
 
Accordingly, research in this field is required, particularly detailed analysis of 
how and to what extent, IHRL binds the UN, and being carried out by the UN 
Peacekeeping Law Reform Project at the University of Essex. Research on the 
functions carried out by UNPKOs, together with the specific application of 
particular rights in a UN Peacekeeping context (such as the right not to be 
arbitrarily detained), would be useful to help piece together a universal 
application of IHRL to the UN. Further to this research, detailed work is also 
needed on both the policy and legal sides to understand better which 
mechanisms would be most sensible to operationalise the application of IHRL to 
the UN. 
 
(d) International Criminal Law, Transitional Justice and UNPKOs 
 
Research is also needed to understand what obligations the UN has under 
international criminal law, and what is the scope of its obligations and duties 
towards the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the other international 
criminal tribunals. The ICC’s cases will invariably be in the same places where 
there are UNPKOs (as is the case in the DRC, Central African Republic and 
Sudan), as they both are operating in conflict and post-conflict situations. The 
Bosco Ntaganda case has made it abundantly clear that the UN needs to 
                                                        
24 The Model Status-of-Forces Agreement is the default agreement governing 
relations between the UN and the host State. 
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understand better how it should engage for example with those subject to 
international criminal arrest warrants. 
 
The prospect of involvement with individuals suspected of committing war 
crimes also begs the question of the UN’s position in relation to transitional 
justice, from both a legal and a policy perspective. Research needs to be done to 
link the UN’s existing work on transitional justice (such as the Secretary-
General’s Guidance Note on Transitional Justice) to the normative framework for 
UN Peacekeeping. Ultimately, this will be closely related to understanding the 
UN’s human rights obligations, and could play a role in enhancing the ability and 
capacity of UNPKOs to engage in rule of law activities in the crucial post-conflict 
period. Again, a failure to do this would undermine UN credibility, as the UN 
would be seen to be failing to meet the standards that it publicly espouses. 
 
(e) Attribution of conduct and responsibility 
 
Attribution of conduct is an overarching theme that provides the backdrop to the 
substantive issues of IHRL and ICL listed above. In order to ensure that the UN is 
responsible for its conduct, there is a need for a greater understanding of legally 
how responsibility can be attributed to the UN and other international 
organisations. Presently, national and international courts have tentatively cited 
(and in some cases ignored) the draft Articles on Responsibility of International 
Organizations as the basis for establishing responsibility. However further work 
is needed in this area to understand fully in what circumstances the UN is 
responsible. This is most evidently the case in situations of potential parallel 
responsibility, that is where the individual State and the UN may jointly or 
separately be held liable for breaches of IHRL, ICL and other aspects of 
international law. At present, many national courts have used the international 
law of responsibility to attribute conduct to the UN, thus avoiding the perhaps 
politically dangerous precedent of finding their national State liable for such a 
breach. This has been done is cases where many have considered it 
unacceptable, for example, the European Court of Human Rights holding that the 
UN is responsible for the actions of NATO forces. Further research is needed on 
when and how parallel responsibility can be achieved, and the legal and policy 
implications of such findings, in the interests of narrowing what amounts to a 
gap in accountability caused by legal uncertainty in this area.  
 
(f) Accountability and reparations 
 
There is clearly a problem of accountability in relation to the conduct of UNPKOs, 
caused both by the wide immunities that benefit UN personnel, the significant 
limitations on claims against the UN, and the lack of an adequate forum to hear 
cases against the UN. Research in this area is required, particularly on how to 
hold the UN accountable for breaches of international law in a fair and 
transparent way, as well as on how to ensure better redress for victims. This 
would also be consistent with closer analysis of the UN’s IHRL obligations as 
presently it is unlikely that the UN reparations scheme meets the requirements 
of an adequate, effective and timely remedy under IHRL. An improvement in UN 
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accountability for failings will lead to better UN practices and processes in 
peacekeeping. 
 
Whilst accountability is a problem, there are good reasons why the immunity 
regime was implemented, and the policy questions of resources, and freedom of 
action for the UN (including not being held as a hostage to fortune by host or 
other States) will need to be weighed against the imperatives of improving the 
human rights situation and the credibility of the UN. 
 
5  Summary and conclusions 
 
As outlined above, there is a significant need for a greater understanding of the 
way that the UN and UNPKOs are bound by international law, and the legal, 
policy and operational implications resulting from such an understanding.  
 
Clarity in the law in the UN Peacekeeping context would serve a number of 
different objectives. As in other spheres, it would help to regulate and set the 
parameters for policy choices and activities. UN Peacekeeping is a highly 
politicised environment and more clarity of the law in this area would help 
ensure that peacekeeping activities are mandated and carried out in accordance 
with proven common values, and act as a counter-balance against short-term 
political thinking and pressures. This would also help to further the international 
rule of law by grounding the UN’s actions in its obligations under the UN Charter, 
as States’ individual actions are already grounded in their own obligations 
generally. 
 
This paper has focused on the legal issues most pressing on UN Peacekeeping at 
the moment, particularly in relation to the use of force, and international human 
rights and international criminal law. The involvement of UN peacekeepers in 
potential violations of these areas of law has embroiled the UN in controversy 
and undermined its credibility and its attempts to achieve the principles and 
purposes of the UN Charter. Success in understanding and addressing these 
issues is key if UN Peacekeeping is to continue to grow and to operate as a tool to 
enhance peace and security in the 21st century. The impact on UN Peacekeeping’s 
effectiveness of improved trust and support should not be underestimated. 
 
The UN Peacekeeping Law Reform Project at the University of Essex and the 
Institute of Democracy and Conflict Resolution have made a start in examining 
some of the issues raised in this paper, engaging with academics, government 
and UN officials, military personnel with peacekeeping experience, non-
governmental organisations, and other experts from different backgrounds and 
disciplines in a consultative research project intended to resolve some of the 
questions identified above, particularly in relation to the applicability of IHRL to 
the UN. 
 
As set out in Section 4, further multi-disciplinary research is needed in this area, 
both to clarify the law, but also to weigh the political, policy and operational 
challenges and implications of the application of international law and standards 
to UNPKOs. 
